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FOREWORD
In January 2013, France launched military operations
in northern Mali. Backed by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2085 (December 2012) that authorized the deployment of an African-led International
Support Mission in Mali, Operation SERVAL sought
to wrest control of northern Mali from al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups. The reestablishment of security in the country’s north was a
necessary prerequisite for addressing other factors in
Mali’s complex crisis, namely the coup that overthrew
the civilian government and the long-running Tuareg
nationalist movement.
Dr. Dona J. Stewart’s monograph explores the underlying root causes of the complex crisis in Mali that created
a safe haven for militants and criminals in the country’s
remote and impoverished northern region. A series of
Tuareg rebellions, the latest fueled by the so-called Arab
spring and the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, combined with increasing AQIM activity, severely strained
the central government’s ability to maintain security.
AQIM quickly capitalized on the security vacuum created by the March 2012 military coup. Today, a significant level of physical security has been reestablished in
the north and a new president has been elected; but Mali
must overcome significant challenges in order to achieve
long-term stability. Dr. Stewart argues that long-term
stability in Mali must address the economic and political
disparities that undermine effective national integration.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the
most touted symbols of Africa’s democratic potential
fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a
4-decade-old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights, fueled by
weapons from Muammar Gadaffi’s fallen government
and perhaps the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the
increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of
government control and poverty and seized the major
cities in the north. The imposition of a severe form of
Islamic law and a growing food crisis sent the population fleeing south across Mali’s international borders. The French-led military intervention, Operation
SERVAL, ousted the militants from the main cities in
the north, but did not address the crisis’ underlying
issues including the grievances that feed the Tuareg
nationalist movement, the establishment of a civilianled government in Mali, and the near- and long-term
threats to food security. The eruption of this crisis also
demands a critical look at the Sahel’s regional security
framework, and the U.S. role in it.
In Part I, Background to the Crisis, the author explores the deeper background to the crisis and sets
it within Mali’s historical and geographical context.
Though it was a major world power in the Middle
Ages the former Malian Empire had long lost its economic strength by the time the European countries
colonized Africa. To control their territory, the French
used military means to try to bring the pastoralists in
the Sahel, such as the Tuareg, under control. Independent since 1960, Mali struggled to develop political
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institutions and achieve economic growth. After years
of dictatorial rule, Mali transitioned to democracy
in 1992. Despite considerable economic aid from the
United States, it remained one of the poorest countries
in the region. Indeed, the neighborhood, the Sahel
zone that runs east to west through the continent, is a
zone of poor, ungoverned spaces, sometimes referred
to as the “arc of instability.”
In Part II: The Crisis Unfolds, the author examines
the recent events that created the volatile conditions
leading to the crisis. The Tuareg nationalist movement
has existed for over 40 years; there have been at least
four periods of rebellion, and military force has been
the primary response from the central government.
Gadaffi had long been a supporter of the Tuareg, employing them in trusted positions within his military.
The fall of his regime sent many Tuaregs home, laden
with heavy weaponry, escalating the rebellion to new
heights. Due to a steady expansion into the Sahel zone
over the last decade, AQIM was well poised to capitalize on the anarchy and seize the north’s major cities.
The fall of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal to AQIM illustrates the need for a critical examination of the U.S.led regional security framework, which is the focus
of Part III: The Regional Security Framework in the
Sahel. Numerous factors hindered the effectiveness of
this framework, including the newness of the military
partnerships with regional governments, their differing strategic level interests, and the wide range of capabilities among their armed forces. Building partner
counterterrorism capability to meet the transnational
al-Qaeda threat was the primary focus of the security
framework through programs such as the Pan Sahel
Initiative (PSI) and the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism
Partnership (TSCTP). However, it was ill-prepared
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for a complex crisis that included a largely secular
nationalist rebellion, the overthrow of a civilian government by U.S.-trained soldiers, and a large-scale
humanitarian crisis.
Long-term stability in northern Mali will require
a more multidimensional approach that considers
threats beyond those posed by Islamist militants such
as AQIM. Physical security, secured through military and law enforcement efforts, is a prerequisite for
the development of institutions of good governance.
Without such institutions, physical security is fleeting,
requiring constant intervention when a crisis erupts.
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WHAT IS NEXT FOR MALI?
THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT
AND CHALLENGES TO STABILITY
The United States strongly condemns the violence initiated by elements of the armed forces of Mali. We call
for the immediate restoration of constitutional rule in
Mali, including full civilian authority over the armed
forces and respect for the country’s democratic institutions and traditions. . . .
		
		

The White House
March 20121

What have you got to say my friends
About this painful time we are living through?
Lyrics from the song,
Imidiwan Ma Tennam,
by the Tuareg-Berber band,
Tinariwen, 20112

INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the descent of Mali into chaos appears swift and sudden. Mali had often been described
as a model of democracy and stability on the continent.
Long recognized for its cultural richness embodied in
ancient cities such as Timbuktu, Mali is also a close
ally of the United States and an important participant
in Global War on Terror3 (GWOT) efforts to counter
terrorism and improve security in the Sahel region. In
February 2012, Mali hosted the Atlas Accord, an annual joint U.S.-Mali military exercise that focused on
improved air drop capabilities to effectively deliver
military resupply materials and humanitarian aid.4
Just a few weeks later, on March 22, members of
the Malian military, led by a U.S.-trained soldier, Cap1

tain Amadou Sanogo, overthrew Mali’s democratically-led civilian government. At the time, northern Mali
was already deeply embroiled in a long-running conflict between the Tuareg ethnic minority and the government. Indeed, frustration at the lack of sufficient
central government support in the military campaign
against the Tuareg rebels was a major justification cited by the coup leaders for their actions. The coup and
the ongoing Tuareg rebellion created a severe security
vacuum in Mali’s northern provinces. Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had been expanding
its reach in the Sahel over the last decade, was quick to
capitalize on the void and occupied the north’s major
cities. Waves of refugees fled; those who stayed faced
life under harsh interpretations of sharia, or Islamic
law, imposed by AQIM and allied groups such as
Ansar Dine.
With Mali’s democratically elected government
overthrown, French troops, under the auspices of a
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR),
initiated combat operations against Islamist militants
in the country’s remote northern region in January 2013.5 In less than a month, Operation SERVAL
forced AQIM and allied groups out of the region’s cities, clearing the way for an African-led International
Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) organized by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the potential return of democratic rule to the
country as a whole.
Though events in Mali have moved quickly over
the last year, and indeed continue to do so, the underlying causes of the current crisis are long-standing.
The dissatisfaction of the Tuaregs, the legacies of colonial rule, and geographic realities are by no means
new developments. However, more recent events
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have served to catalyze simmering issues into active
conflict. The political and security instability created
by the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in
Libya and the coup d’etat that ousted Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, for example, emboldened an array of actors, including Tuareg rebels with
nationalist causes, criminals, and various groups of
Islamic militants.
The interrelated security challenges Mali faces today are complex, summed up by David Lewis as “a
toxic cocktail of rebels, weapons, refugees, drought,
smugglers, and violent Islamic militants.”6 While the
transnational threat posed by AQIM and affiliated
groups is of deepest concern to the United States and
its European allies, violent extremism is only one of a
number of issues destabilizing Mali’s security. Given
the interconnected nature of these challenges, policies
and security frameworks that follow the French intervention must take a broad and comprehensive approach to security and stability in Mali that goes well
beyond the provision of physical security.
Legal restrictions prevented the United States from
providing direct military aid to Mali after March 2012
because that government seized power in a coup.7 The
United States provided intelligence and air logistical
support to the French military operation. Three KC135 tankers were used to refuel French jet fighters
and bombers, and the United States provided airlift
to transport a French mechanized infantry to Mali.8 It
seems likely the U.S. role in Mali, and in the region
overall, will increase. In January 2013, the United
States signed a status of forces agreement with neighboring Niger, a move that could pave the way for a
possible U.S. drone base. Niger is also the focus for the
development of an intelligence hub by both the United
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States and the French.9 The restoration of democratic
rule, through elections scheduled for July 2013, will
also enable the United States to resume its foreign aid
programs for Mali, some of which were suspended
after the March 2012 coup.10
With AQIM now rooted out of Mali’s northern cities, the current dual challenge for the United States,
France, and the broader international community is to
craft a policy that will bring long-term stability to a
key ally in the fight against violent Islamic extremism
in the Sahel and, at the same time, rebuild a regional
security framework. While restoring physical security
is obviously central to this framework, the underlying
complex and overlapping socio-economic and political issues that impact security must also be addressed.
This monograph attempts to contribute to the current discussions on the future U.S. policy for Mali by
exploring the deeper background to the crisis. Such
issues include the long-running grievances of the Tuareg minority, the challenges of uneven development,
regional instability wrought by the Arab Spring, and a
worsening humanitarian crisis. This monograph will
also examine the weaknesses of the regional security
framework in place prior to the March 2012 coup and
the challenges a new regional security framework
will need to overcome to bring effective, long-term
security to this crucial region.
Why Mali Matters.
Mali is remote and distant from much of the globe.
It is one of the poorest countries in the world. And yet,
the situation in Mali and the future of the country will
have significant impact at the national, regional, and
international levels.
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Geography is the key to much of Mali’s importance. Nestled deep in the interior of West Africa, Mali
encompasses over 478,841 square miles (1,240,192
square kilometers [km]),11 a large territory approximately the size of France or twice the size of Texas
in the United States. With only 15.84 million people,12
Mali is sparsely populated. The north is either desert
or semi-arid, and over 90 percent of the population is
heavily concentrated in the country’s less arid southern half. The capital, Bamako, located on the Niger
River, boasts over 1.6 million people and is one of the
fastest growing cities in Africa.13 In the north, though
cities such as Gao and Timbuktu loom large in ancient
history, they are a fraction of the size of Bamako and
host few economic opportunities.

Source: World Factbook, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence
Agency, August 13, 2013.

Map 1. Mali.
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Mali is landlocked and shares long and often permeable borders with seven other states: Algeria (1,376km, 855 miles), Niger (821-km, 510 miles), Burkina
Faso (1,000-km, 621 miles), Côte d’Ivoire (532-km, 330
miles), Guinea (858-km, 533 miles), Senegal (419-km,
260 miles) and Mauritania (2,237-km, 1390 miles).14
These borders are difficult to control, facilitating untracked movement across the Sahel, the semi-arid zone
between the Sahara Desert and the more arable lands
in the south. The Sahel zone (also known as the transSahel) is vast, approximately 1,000-km (621 miles)
wide, and stretches across the continent from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. This transition zone is
not true desert as areas of sparse seasonal vegetation,
clay plains, and water holes can be found throughout the Sahel. Historically, pastoralists, such as the
Tuareg ethnic group, migrated seasonally throughout this zone, maintaining a livelihood from camels,
cattle, sheep, and goats, a practice long predating the
creation of the current state boundaries.15 In the era
before long distance sea navigation, the trans-Saharan
trade routes connected Africa to the Mediterranean
zone and further on to Europe. Though foreboding
and arduous, the Sahara has never been impassable,
for thousands of years people, ideas, and goods have
flowed across its sands.
Today, this vast, undergoverned space within the
region has become a safe haven for Islamic militants,
primarily AQIM and affiliated groups, as well as
smugglers of weapons and drugs. The states in this
region lack the resources, both financial and institutional capacity, to effectively meet the challenges of
organized militancy and criminality. In many countries, this ungoverned space is in the hinterlands,
physically and psychologically distant from the na-
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tional capital. The capital cities of Nouakchott, located
on the Atlantic Ocean, and Algiers and Tripoli on the
Mediterranean Sea, are many hundreds of miles away
from vast desert interiors of Mauritania, Algeria, and
Libya, complicating efforts to exert effective control.
Many of the countries in the region also face significant domestic political issues, and counterterrorism
efforts must compete with other priorities, a fact that
has complicated efforts to develop an effective regional security framework.
The potential for unrest in Mali to spread beyond
its borders to vulnerable neighbors has raised international concern. In September 2012, António Guterres,
the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for
Refugees and former prime minister of Portugal,
warned that:
If unchecked, the Mali crisis threatens to create an arc
of instability extending west into Mauritania and east
through Niger, Chad and Sudan to the Horn of Africa
and the Gulf of Aden, characterized by extended spaces where state authority is weak and pockets of territorial control are exercised by transnational criminals.16

Within the international security community, the
specter of collaboration among militant groups across
this undergoverned territory is a growing concern:
On the African continent, ties between radical groups
Boko Haram, al Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and its offshoots—the Unity Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar
Dine—are becoming stronger; as are ties with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.17

To use a Cold War analogy, one fear is that the collapse of Mali could unleash a domino effect—destabilizing countries throughout the Sahel for the benefit
7

of criminals and militant groups, including AQIM.
The freedom of movement found in an “arc of instability” that runs across the continent from the Atlantic coast of West Africa to the Horn of Africa on the
Red Sea can be seen as a primary enabler for violent
extremists in the region. Such freedom of movement
could facilitate cooperation between groups such as
AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Mali, Boko Haram in
Nigeria, and al Shabaab in Somalia. The recent discovery of instructions on how to avoid drone strikes
in a building abandoned by AQIM in Mali, authored
by Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), illustrates the types of operational and technical cooperation across the network.18 The document
contained 22 tips, ranging from low technology approaches—attaching reflective pieces of glass to cars
or the roofs of buildings—to the more sophisticated
use of a Russian-made “sky grabber” device to infiltrate the drone’s waves and the frequencies that can
be purchased for around $2,595.19
Common to the countries through which this arc
passes are “poverty, underdevelopment, illiteracy,
mass youth unemployment, misgovernance, authoritarianism, corruption, suppression of women’s rights
as well as human and civil rights in general.”20 Many
of these same characteristics could be found in the
“Arab Spring” countries that experienced a wave of
revolutions in 2011 suggesting they help create a fertile ground for revolution. While such mass popular
movements may eventually lead to the development
of a robust civil society and democratic institutions,
the political and social disruption also create a window of opportunity for other actors, namely violent
extremist organizations, to exercise control in the resulting security vacuum.
8

Finally, the humanitarian impact of the Malian
crisis, addressed later in this monograph, is another
reason this crisis matters. Described by General Carter
F. Ham, the former commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as “patently the most difficult to
address,”21 the humanitarian condition is one of the
spectrum of issues that must be addressed following
the French intervention.
PART I - MALI: BACKGROUND TO A CRISIS
Mali: Ancient Grandeur, Modern Challenges.
A detailed exploration of Mali’s history is well
beyond the scope of this monograph, however, some
aspects of Mali’s historical development, as well as
Mali’s place in history provide essential context for
understanding the dynamics that have led to the current crisis. Mali became an independent country only
in 1960, its modern state identity is recent and often
contested, with internal divisions and conditions that
make it vulnerable to nonstate actors such as AQIM.
The origins of the modern state of Mali can be
traced to the Malian Empire which existed from 1230
to 1600 CE. The Malian Empire began as a tribal confederation of the Mandika people united under Sunidiata Keita (c. 1217-55), who ruled under the name Mari
Djata.22 The empire consolidated and grew under his
25-year reign. The empire controlled a vast territory in
West Africa that stretched to the Atlantic Ocean, a far
larger area than that of the modern state.
Most of what the West knows of ancient Mali comes
from the writings of Muslim scholars such as the Moroccan explorer Ibn Battuta (1304-68). Ibn Battuta left
Sijilmasa, Morocco, on the northern edge of the Sahara
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and travelled south by caravan, stopping at oases and
salt mines along the way. After 2 months, the caravan
reached the southern junction of the trans-Saharan
trade route, Oualata.23 Ibn Battuta continued his journey on to Timbuktu, at the time a small provincial
town; from there he went by canoe to Gao, an important center of trade.24 Ibn Battuta’s journey reflects the
significance Mali had in the Islamic world at the time.
His contemporary, the sociologist and historian Ibn
Khaldun (1332-1406), recorded the royal genealogy of
the Malian Empire, and captured some of the empire’s
oral history and traditions. Oral history was the norm
by which events were embedded into the collective
memory of the community.25 Throughout West Africa,
this oral history was preserved and passed down by
griots (or jeli), a tradition that continues today. These
oral historians held a prominent position in society,
sometimes serving as advisors to the emperor.26
Gold was the main source of the empire’s wealth,
indeed it was gold and control over the trans-Saharan
trade, that gave the Malian Empire its global significance. Gao and Timbuktu, on the edge of the Sahara,
were vibrant trading centers and an economic crossroads into the desert and on to the Levant and Europe.
Gold travelled north, salt travelled south. The empire
enjoyed great periods of prosperity, especially under
the famed ruler Mansa Musa.27 Though the founder
of the Malian Empire, Sundiata Keita (d. 1255) was
not Muslim, the Mali Empire contained a diverse mix
of ethnic groups and religions. The later adoption of
Islam by Mali’s rulers facilitated the spread of Islam
into West Africa during the medieval period. A devout Muslim, Mansa Musa undertook the pilgrimage
to Mecca in 1324, and historical accounts speak of a
grand and lavish procession. He was accompanied
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by approximately 60,000 men. At that time, the Malian Empire controlled half of the world’s supply of
gold and salt. Eighty camels transported hundreds of
pounds of gold dust, while 12,000 slaves each carried
4-pound bars of gold.28 Musa spent so much gold in
the bazaars of Cairo that gold prices were depressed
and inflation rampant for a decade thereafter. The
extravagance of this journey caught the attention of
Western scholars and mapmakers, and knowledge of
Timbuktu and Mali spread.
During the 15th century, Timbuktu grew into a
center of Islamic scholarship and learning, in addition to trade. Mosques, libraries, and Koranic schools
(madrasas) were constructed. By the 16th century, the
city’s population had grown to 100,000. The global
cultural significance of Timbuktu’s buildings, and the
role of the city as a spiritual and intellectual center
for the spread of Islam in Africa, was recognized in
1998 as a World Heritage Site by the United Nations
Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization
(UNESCO). The site includes three earthen-brick
mosques: Djingareyber, Sankore, and Sidi Yahia. Dating to the 13th century, they are considered exceptional examples of a building technique found typically in
arid environments.29 Sixteen mausoleums are also included on the list. Indeed, Timbuktu is also known as
“the city of 333 saints,” a reference to the many mausoleums of Sufi preachers and scholars constructed in
the city over the centuries.30
Imperial Mali’s leaders promoted Timbuktu’s
scholarly and intellectual development. Leo Africanus
(1494-1554), the Moorish diplomat and historian, described the city in his geographical history of Africa:
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There are in Timbuktu numerous judges, teachers and
priests, all properly appointed by the king. He greatly
honors learning. Many hand-written books imported
from Barbary [North Africa] are also sold. There is
more profit made from this commerce than from all
other merchandise.31

So strong was the demand for learning that a distinct trans-Saharan book trade developed during the
12th and 13th centuries. Two types of books dominated the trade: (1) illuminated copies of the Koran, rich
with calligraphy, and (2) less expensive, more functional copies of instructional and reference works.32
The many mosques and schools in Timbuktu drove
up demand for these texts. The University of Sankore
(Masjid Sankore) alone contained 180 madrasas and
25,000 students.
Libraries, madrasas, scholars, and even families
amassed collections of manuscripts. Before Islamic militants seized the city in 2012, Timbuktu was
thought to contain as many as 300,000 antique manuscripts. Many of them were housed at the modern
Ahmad Babu Institute, where they were restored
and preserved; still others lay in private hands. The
collection was priceless, containing manuscripts in
Arabic as well as a few in African languages, “such
as Songhai, Tamashek, and Bambara. There was even
one in Hebrew. They covered a diverse range of topics including astronomy, poetry, music, medicine, and
women’s rights. The oldest dated from 1204.”33
Timbuktu’s cultural patrimony, its shared history
of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious past, has come
under severe attack, especially from the Tuareg Islamist militant group Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine began
destroying the shrines in July 2012, taking pickaxes
to them. Ansar Dine considers the Sufi shrines to be
12

idolatrous and vowed to destroy all of them.34 The
Sidi Yahia mosque was also damaged. As they fled
the city in January 2013, militant Islamists set fire to
the Ahmad Babu Institute, and internationally funded
library that restored, repaired, and stored irreplaceable manuscripts.35 However, the loss is not nearly as
great as first feared; quiet acts of resistance by Timbuktu’s residents, who have long-cherished these
manuscripts, saved many.
An imam (mosque leader) transferred 8,000 manuscripts to a secret location, many manuscripts are in
the hands of private families—one hid their 3,000 item
collection in another undisclosed location. At the Ahmad Babu Institute, nearly the entire collection was
surreptitiously removed in small batches and sent to
Bamako. Fleeing militants were able to find less than 5
percent of the collection.36
This is not the first time citizens of Timbuktu have
hid their prized manuscripts from invaders, during
the French colonial period, they hid them in wooden
trunks, buried them in the sand, and secreted them in
caves to keep them out of Europe’s museums or private collections.37 But in February 2013, it was French
President François Hollande, alongside the Director
General of UNESCO, who pledged to reconstruct and
safeguard Timbuktu’s cultural heritage.38
European Control of Africa.
The arrival of French forces into northern Mali in
2013 was, of course, a return to a country that France
once controlled as part of a colonial empire, and that
France continues to influence. Following centuries
where Europe had relatively little contact with the
continent, the 18th century saw a renewed interest,
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and a rediscovery of Africa on the part of Europe. With
the invention of new navigational technology, such as
the dry mariner’s compass and marine astrolabe, European explorers no longer hugged the African coastline, but ventured out across the oceans, launching the
“Age of Exploration.”39 Europe had turned toward the
New World and its riches. The global economic world
system was dramatically altered, land routes that
controlled trade for centuries were surpassed by sea
routes, and major trade cities such as Cairo went into
decline, while other cities captured the new global
trade driven by Europe.40
Exploration of the continent and its interior in the
18th century and competition between rival European
imperial powers drove European interest in Africa. In
1798, Napoleon Bonaparte launched a military campaign in Syria and Egypt. While the stated goal was to
protect French trade interests, the French intent was
to limit Britain’s access to the “jewel” of its overseas
empire, India. The Napoleonic campaign was no ordinary military engagement. Nearly 200 scientists
participated in a scientific expedition; its goal was to
catalog the artifacts of ancient and modern Egypt as
well as its natural history. The result was published
in a series of large volumes, entitled the Description de
l’Égypte, which helped feed a growing European appetite for the “orient.”41
The exploits of explorers such as Sir Richard Burton further fueled interest. Often sponsored by the
British Royal Geographic Society, Burton carried out
a series of daring explorations in the mid-century.
He became well known after making the Islamic pilgrimage (hajj) to Mecca, and then turned to exploration of Africa’s interior, in search of the origin of the
Nile River. Burton was a very prolific writer, writing
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hundreds of books and articles on his various adventures.42 At the same time, David Livingstone explored
south and central Africa and named the renowned
waterfall “Victoria Falls” in honor of the Queen of
England. All European contact with Livingstone was
lost for 6 years and his death was rumored, a tale that
gripped the public. This fascination with Africa, and
geopolitical rivalry, was not limited to Europe. In 1869
the anti-British editor of the New York Herald ordered
his journalist, Henry Morton Stanley, to find and rescue the lost explorer. His successful search led to the—
possibly apocryphal—account of their meeting: “Dr.
Livingstone, I presume?”43
Europe was now convinced of Africa’s strategic
importance, a result of both location and the numerous
accounts of the continent’s vast untapped resources.
For Europe’s voracious imperial appetite, Africa was
the last frontier that could be exploited. In 1884-85,
a conference was held in Berlin, Germany, to set the
ground rules among the European powers for colonization and trade activities. In reality, the “Congo
Conference” formalized the rules for the rapid expansion of European interests in Africa, also known as
the “Scramble for Africa.” The conference participants
accepted the concept of “effective occupation” in determining which country could claim a geographical
area. Means of establishing effective occupation included entering into treaties with local, indigenous
leaders, establishing an administrative presence and
maintaining order with a police force.44 As soon as
the ground rules were laid down, European countries raced against each other to claim a territory as
their own.
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Mali Under French Control.
The area that encompasses Mali today was originally part of a French colonial territory known as the
French Sudan formed in 1890.45 Though there were
rumors of the region’s great wealth, no doubt a legacy
of the medieval accounts, France’s primary interest in
the area was to link their holdings in Senegal and Algeria and provide access to the Congo and its riches
through Lake Chad. France had seized Algeria against
great opposition in 1830. Algeria was a central component of France’s overseas empire; it was integrated
into metropolitan France as a department in 1848 and
became part of French political life. France’s economic
ties with Algeria were deep, and tens of thousands of
Europeans settled there.
European states, especially France, Netherlands,
and Portugal, had long competed for trade along the
Senegalese coastline. In 1444, Portugal established a
major center for slave trading on the Island of Goreé;
Britain seized control of it as a result of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) and abolished slavery. France’s
involvement in West Africa began in 1637, when they
built a fort at the mouth of the Senegal River and began to explore the interior. By the 1850s, France was
working to establish control further inland in order to
consolidate its colonial empire.46
The French Sudan was part of a set of colonies that
made up the Federation of West Africa (existed from
1865 to 1960), which included Senegal, French Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger,
Mauritania, and Dahomey (Benin today). French West
Africa encompassed an area of approximately 1.8 million square miles (4,689,000 square kilometers [km])
and a diverse population composed of a great many
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ethnic groups who spoke many languages. Within the
federation, French was the common language. France
also established a common currency, the French West
African Franc.47 Each colony of French West Africa
was administered by a Lieutenant Governor, responsible to the Governor General in Dakar, Senegal. Only
the Governor General received orders from Paris.
France also held colonies in adjacent North Africa, as
well as a few in equatorial Africa and East Africa, and
numerous island possessions.
The Pacification of the Sahel.
French penetration and control of the interior of
the French Sudan was met with significant resistance.
There was little French presence in the interior prior
to the 1850s. French explorer René Callié was the first
European to visit Timbuktu (1827) and return alive; a
British officer, Major Gordon Laign, had preceded his
arrival in the city but was killed shortly after he departed. Callié published his account of his journey in
Journal d’un voyage à Temboctou et à Jenné dans l’Afrique
Centrale.48
Callié was eager to reach Timbuktu, which he described as “an object of curiosity and research to the
civilised nations of Europe.” What he found, however,
was a disappointment:
I looked around and found that the sight before me,
did not answer my expectations. I had formed a totally
different idea of the grandeur and wealth of Timbuctoo. The city presented, at ﬁrst view, nothing but a
mass of ill-looking houses, built of earth.49

Indeed, in the centuries since historians had recorded accounts of the Mali Empire at its height, much had
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changed. By the mid-1600s, the empire had broken up
into three parts, following a succession dispute. This
left the empire vulnerable to attack by others, namely
the Bamana people of nearby Djenne. The Timbuktu
Callié found was greatly diminished from that described during the reign of strong emperors such as
Mansa Musa. The social and political fragmentation
that characterized the 19th century western Sahel
both aided and hindered French expansion. While the
French did not have to overcome a strong and wellorganized empire, the fragmentation meant dealing
with a great many, often competing, ethnic groups
and even kinship groups in an effort to establish control. Local inhabitants offered much resistance; there
was no real effective French control until 1899.
European colonialism was based on the desire to
bring “Christianity, civilization, and commerce” to
Africa. Callié’s account of the death of Major Laing
reinforced the justification for European colonialism.
According to Callié’s published account, Major Laing
was killed after refusing to convert to Islam:
When the major had once been discovered to be a
Christian and a European, death was a thousand times
preferable to even a temporary change of religion,
since he must have renounced all hope of again visiting Europe.50

Callié described many of the ethnic groups he encountered during his journey such as the Moors and
Fulani. The Tuaregs (Tooariks), who he calls “mauraders” and “savages” receive the most negative description. Remarking on their control of the desert, he notes
that “The trade of Timbuctoo is considerably cramped
by the Tooariks, a warlike nation who render the inhabitants of the town their tributaries.”51 This nega18

tive image of the Tuareg was further reinforced in
later encounters with the French military as they tried
to “pacify” the Sahel and improve the value of their
colonies through construction of roads and railroads.
In 1880-81, an expedition led by French Colonel
Paul Flatters set out to survey a route for a railroad
that would cross the Sahara. Composed of 300 camels, 10 French soldiers, and 78 “native” guides and
porters, the expedition sought to cross the territory
controlled by one of the tribes that made up the confederation of Tuaregs in the Sahel. The leader of the
Tuaregs denied them permission to cross his territory; likely realizing construction of a railroad would
mean an end to his economic livelihood, the caravan
trade. Colonel Flatters continued into the territory and
found himself drawn into an ambush. Lack of food
and water led to further casualties. None of the French
survived, causing a furor in France with demands that
the Tuaregs be punished. However, it would be another 17 years before the French attempted to establish
control again.52
In 1899, France launched three military missions
from Senegal, Algeria, and the Congo to consolidate
their holdings and to bring them under French control. The Voulet-Chanoine Mission, which set out
from Dakar, Senegal, ended in scandal following the
death of the commanding officers at the hands of their
own soldiers.
Captain Paul Voulet and Adjutant Lieutenant Julien Chanoine led the mission; the other Europeans
included nine officers, a doctor, and three noncommissioned officers. The mission was accompanied by
approximately 100 guides and interpreters, as well as
over 1,000 porters and others that were conscripted to
support the heavily armed mission. Their goal was to
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move through the French Sudan, the interior still had
not submitted to French rule, and reach Lake Chad.
The mission carried few supplies; they were expected
to live off the land:
To get the porters and food they needed, Voulet and
Chanoine burned villages, enslaved populations and
massacred those they did not need. By the time they
were stopped by another French column, their ranks
had swollen to about 3,000, mostly slave women. Historians have often treated Voulet and Chanoine as
men who went mad in the tropical sun, but Fuglestad
argues that the atrocities were simply an extravagant
version of what the French military did elsewhere.53

When French authorities learned of the atrocities
being committed, they sent a column of troops led
by Lieutenant Colonel Jean-François Klobb to relieve
Voulet of his command. Voulet killed Klobb, further
heightening the scandal. The Voulet-Chanoine affair,
the high cost of maintaining the military presence in
the French Sudan, and internal French political turmoil, including the Dreyfus Affair, all led to a reassessment of the military-led pacification strategy for
the Sudan. Control over the Sudan was shifted to the
civilian colonial government, and military operations were restricted.54 Resistance to French control
in the Sahara continued well into the 1930s, when
airplanes allowed greater ability to track the Sahel’s
population.55
Even outside the areas that faced military pacification, colonial policies affected the indigenous African
population. To improve the colony, Africans were
forced to work without pay on public works such as
road building. They could be imprisoned without trial
and could not engage in political activity. They were
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subject to military draft.56 Indeed, thousands of African soldiers fought and died in World Wars I and II,
where they played a pivotal role in the liberation of
France from Nazi Germany:
On Aug. 15, 1944, two months after the Allied landings in Normandy, a French force of 200,000, with an
estimated 65 percent of them from former colonies,
landed in Provence with the U.S. Seventh Army. They
fought through the suburbs of Toulon and Marseille,
moving on to help repel the Germans from the eastern Vosges Mountains and Alsace before crossing the
Rhine. Historians estimate that about 40,000 troops of
African origin died liberating the country.57

When French troops entered in Mali’s northern cities in 2013, some Malians held signs recalling the role
of Mali in liberating France.
Malian Independence.
The movement toward decolonization in Africa
grew very quickly after World War II. Many African
countries experienced a growing wave of nationalism and a desire for independence. For the European
imperial states, their economies shattered by war, far
flung overseas colonies were expensive to keep. Intensifying violent nationalist movements among the colonial subjects made the price even steeper. In Kenya,
for example, the Mau Mau Rebellion against British
control broke out in 1952. Shortly thereafter, France
found themselves engaged in an increasingly bloody
guerrilla war in Algeria.58
The Algerian War for Independence (or Algerian
Revolution) lasted from 1954 to 1962. It was extremely
costly, both financially and in loss of life. The war was
characterized by the use of insurgent tactics in an urban
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environment, famously depicted in the film, The Battle
of Algiers. By 1956, over 400,000 French troops were
committed to Algeria.59 Backlash over the handling of
the Algerian war led to fall of the French Fourth Republic and the return of General Charles de Gaulle to
power. In 1959, he declared that “self-determination”
would be the preferred solution to the Algerian conflict.60 Following referendums in France and Algeria
as well as long negotiations, Algerian independence
was granted on July 3, 1962. Death tolls for the conflict
range from 400,000 to 1.5 million.61
The French Sudan received independence from
France in 1960, in the midst of the crisis over Algeria.
In the post-World War II period, relations between
France and its territories in West Africa were marked
by debate over the nature of the relationship between
France and the colonies. Among the African elite, who
had assimilated much of French culture and on whom
the French depended to administer the colonies, slogans such as “federalism” and “independence” took
center stage. At the same time, the French authorities
began to allow indigenous political activity and the
formation of political parties. Britain’s announcement
that the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) would become independent in 1957 further drove the movement toward independence in French Sudan. French
control over West Africa was dealt a steep blow in 1958
when Guinea voted “no” on a referendum to continue
an association with France, and relations between the
two countries were cut. Shortly thereafter, the Sudanese Republic (Mali) and Senegal joined a federation,
while other colonies sought independent statehood.
Together, they achieved independence in 1960 as the
Mali Federation.62 Their union did not last, and, after
a few months, Senegal withdrew, and the Sudanese
Republic was renamed Mali.63
22

PART II: THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
Mali: The Challenges of Development.
Like other newly independent countries in Africa,
Mali faced enormous political, geographic, and economic challenges at independence, and many of these
persist into the present, contributing to the underlying
causes of the current crisis. Unsurprisingly, state level
institutions for governance and politics were underdeveloped or absent in the newly independent state.
According to William Foltz, specific issues Mali faced
included:
Separation of the political process and governmental
activity from the lives of most people . . . Existence of
a small, relatively homogeneous political elite, lack of
stable internal political process permitting a peaceful
and democratic replacement of elites and offering the
possibility of a return to political office once a person
has lost a political contest.64

Mali’s first president, the nationalist leader Modibo Keita, was elected to the presidency of the Mali
Federation in 1960; when the federation dissolved,
he became president of Mali, a position he held until
1968. In 1968, General Moussa Traoré overthrew Keita
in a coup d’état. Under Traoré’s 2 decades of rule,
Mali was a virtual police state in which political activity was not tolerated. The repressive climate eventually brought an end to Traoré’s 23-year regime. Robert
Pringle, who served as U.S. ambassador to Mali between 1987 and 1990 observed:
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In March 1991, Mali’s military dictator made the fatal
mistake of ordering his troops to fire on students protesting in the capital, and several hundred were killed.
In the wave of shocked public reaction that followed,
a key military commander, Colonel Amadou Toumani
Touré, joined the pro-democracy forces, and the dictatorship collapsed. Touré, better known as “ATT,”
promised to hand over power to an elected government. Like Cincinnatus, the Roman farmer who took
up arms and then returned to his fields, Touré kept his
word, surprising many of his fellow Malians.65

Touré’s decision to relinquish power to the civilian
government launched a new political era in Mali,
characterized by democratic processes rather than
violent overthrow:
Until the 1992 presidential election Malians had never
experienced a change of government by means other
than a coup d’état. A decade later the 2002 election of
ATT to the presidency marked the first time in Mali’s
history that power would be passed from one democratically elected president to another.66

This success made Mali a symbol of Africa’s democratic potential. After the 1992 elections, Mali held
successful, multiparty presidential elections again in
1997, reelecting President Alpha Oumar Konaré to a
second 5-year term.67 In 2002, a field of 24 candidates
vied for the presidency. After two rounds of voting,
Touré returned to power, transformed from a military
to a civilian leader. He was elected to a second term in
2007. Mali was seen not only as an “African” success
story for democracy but also offered proof that Islam
and democracy were compatible.
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While radical Islam has inhibited the creation of democratic institutions in other parts of the Muslim world,
Malians do not widely perceive such radicalism as a
threat to their democracy. Indeed, radical Islam seems
to be growing slowly—if at all—in Mali. Further, Malians see the long-standing problem of unrest and near
anarchy in the desert north not as a democratization
problem but rather as a security problem—that is, as a
threat to national unity.68

Eventually, this conflict in the north, fueled in part
by radical Islamists, felled Malian democracy when
Touré’s civilian government was overthrown in a
coup led by Captain Amadou Sanago in March 2012.
President Touré went into hiding after the coup, but
in April he resigned as part of a deal negotiated with
the coup leaders by the ECOWAS. Under the deal,
parliamentary leader Dioncounda Traoré, was sworn
in as interim president at the head of a transitional
administration pending new presidential elections set
for July 2013.69 Touré is now in exile in Senegal.
Mali, like many young states in Africa, has a weak
sense of national unity and national identity. Geography poses significant challenge’s to Mali’s economic
and political development and undermines national
unity. Mali has no outlet to the sea, but West Africa’s
largest river, the Niger, which originates in the highland of Guinea, flows through it. The river passes
through many of the country’s important cities, such
as Bamako, Timbuktu, and Gao, before entering the
ocean along the coast of Niger. Mali is composed of
three distinct regions, delineated primarily by the
amount of rainfall, which ranges from 0 millimeters
(mm) of annual precipitation in the north to 1,550mm in the extreme south. The Sudanese climate of the
south allows considerable agricultural production,

25

while grasslands are common in the semi-arid Sahel
zone. In the north, the Saharan Desert dominates the
countryside.70 Economic opportunities, lifestyle, and
population characteristics differ dramatically across
these zones. Political and economic power is strongly
centered on the urban elites in south of the country.
Mali’s population is very diverse, containing many
ethnic groups. The Manding (Mandé) peoples account
for half of Mali’s population and include the Bambara
and Malinka ethnic groups. These two groups, which
live in southern Mali near the capital of Bamako, are
the largest and most politically dominant. They tend
to make up the elite that benefited from French education during the colonial period.
The Peulh (also called Fula or Fulani) account for
about 11 percent of the population, and they farm or
herd cattle in the Niger delta. The Seina (also called
Senoufo), make up 9.6 percent of the population. They
are primarily farmers, though many have migrated to
cities for work, and live in south-east Mali.
The Soninké who live in north-west Mali’s Sahelian zone make up 7 percent of Mali’s population.
They trace their roots to the Ghana Empire, and trade
is a very important part of their economic life. The
Songhai are descendants of the people of the Soghai
Empire that once existed around Gao. They compose
7 percent of Mali’s population and engage in subsistence farming in southeastern Mali.
The Tuareg and the Maure (Moor) make up about
5 percent of the population. Located in northern Mali,
the Maure are Arab-Berbers that migrate with their
herds between Mali and Mauritiania. The Tuareg, or
Kel Tamasheq (Tamasheq-speaking people) as they
refer to themselves, are nomadic pastoralists, ethnically related to Berbers, who are among the indigenous
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inhabitants of the Sahel and Saharan region. Countries with significant Tuareg populations include Niger (1.7 million), Mali (1.4 million), Algeria (825,000),
Libya (620,000), and Burkina Faso (330,000).71 The
Tuareg are primarily Muslim, though they practice a
syncretic form of Islam, which blends many forms of
pre-Islamic and indigenous practices.72 In Mali, they
are predominately located in the north of the country,
including the main population centers of Gao, Kidal,
and Timbuktu. The Tuaregs are also notable for the
blue, indigo-dyed “veils” worn by males to protect
them from the desert sands while riding. Though the
Tuareg are Muslim, women traditionally do not wear
the veil.
Despite the diversity of Malian society, inter-ethnic and inter-religious tolerance has been the norm.73
This is, in part, attributed to the presence of syncretic
forms of Islam that blend Islam, including Sufi variations, with traditional practices and beliefs. Until the
involvement of radical Islamist groups in the Tuareg
rebellion in the north, political and economic marginalization, not religious beliefs and ethnicity, were the
foci of the conflict. Today, however, there are new ethnic and religious dimensions to the crisis.
Other minority groups include the Dogon (4 percent of population), Bozo (2.8 percent), Diawara (1
percent), and Xaasongaxango (1 percent). Mali is
predominantly Muslim (90 percent), with a small
number of Christians (4 percent) as well as others
who follow traditional religions. French is the official language, Bambara is widely spoken. Other
widely-spoken languages include Fulfulde (Peulh),
Songhai, and Tamasheq, however, a great many other
languages exist.74
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Approximately 90 percent of Mali’s 16.3 million
people live in the south, with the remainder distributed across the country’s sparsely inhabited north,
which inhibits effective integration of these areas,
and their peoples, into the state. Most of the state’s
resources are focused on the south and its population.
The north, particularly the Kidal administrative region
inhabited by the Tuaregs, is very poor in comparison
with the rest of the country, with little local economic
activity. The region depends highly on foreign aid,
which is focused on projects such as road building,
irrigation, health, and education.75
Mali scores very low by most development measures. Ranked 182 out of 187 on the United Nations
Human Development Index (HDI), Mali is labeled
a “low human development” country. The HDI is a
composite measure that compares life expectancy, literacy, education, standards of living, and quality of
life. Mali’s average life expectancy is 51.9 years, and
adults attend only 2 years of school on average.76
Economically, under the World Bank classification
system, Mali is considered a low-income country. The
gross national income per capita (GNI) in 2011 was
$610. Poverty levels are high, and 43.6 percent live
below the national poverty line.77 Mali’s economy is
highly undiversified, and the country is dealing with
one of the highest population growth rates in the
world. In 2011, the population growth rate was 3 percent, driven by a total fertility rate of 6.2 percent.78 Mali
must also deal with the effects of climate change.79
The northern Sahel zone is particularly hard hit
by the consequences of climate change. Drought and
desertification have increased the population’s vulnerability and raised levels of food insecurity. Mali’s
average annual rainfall has decreased 30 percent since
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1998; droughts are longer and more common. Desertification, where land is becoming increasingly arid, is
also a problem in Mali where the Sahara is moving
southward at a rate of 48-km, about 30 miles, a year.80
As a result of the Sahara’s southern movement, Mali is
experiencing “climate zone shift.” This shift will bring
additional negative consequences to Mali. According to 22 global climate models that forecast to 2030,
the most negative scenario could mean a decrease
in rainfall by 10 percent and an increase in average
temperatures by 1.8 degrees fahrenheit (1.4 degrees
celsius). This scenario would result in a $300 million
agricultural loss for Mali. Even under the most optimistic climate models, annuals losses of $120 million
are forecast.81 This anticipated climate change will put
even greater strains on the population and society in
northern Mali, and increase the potential for instability that can be exploited by criminals and militants.
Early Indicators of a Crisis in Northern Mali.
The building crisis in northern Mali went unnoticed by most people in the West. In hindsight, there
were numerous, though perhaps unconventional,
indicators of increasing instability. Essakane, an oasis settlement located 50 miles west of Timbuktu, is
well-known to world music fans. Long a trading location for the Tuareg, it is home to a deep musical tradition, whose sounds evoke comparison with American
blues music.
Since 2001, Essakane had hosted the “Festival au
Desert,” drawing international stars, such as Robert
Plant, musicians from throughout Africa, and thousands of Western spectators every year. Just a few
short years ago, a journalist described this scene:
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In a normal December, the streets of Timbuktu are
crawling with Western tourists. They take tours of the
local libraries full of 12th-century manuscripts, ride
camels into the desert to spend the night under the
stars, and in early January, attend the Festival au Desert, a kind of Saharan Woodstock, where Tuareg and
Malian guitarists trade blues riffs.82

By 2010, in response to the rising number of kidnappings of Westerners in the region by AQIM, the
Malian authorities moved the festival closer in, to the
outskirts of Timbuktu. In November 2011, three European tourists were kidnapped and a German tourist
killed in Timbuktu.83 These attacks, the first in the city
itself, clearly sought to undermine the tourism industry. The attacks, part of a increasingly bold strategy of
kidnappings used by AQIM since 2008, brought additional security to the 2012 Festival au Desert.
In 2013, the organizers announced the festival
would be moved south to Burkina Faso. Not only had
the festival site been destroyed, but speaking from
the city of Gao in August 2012, a spokesman for the
MUJAO, a splinter group of AQIM, issued a ban on all
Western music. In their press release, the organizers
noted, “It is an attack on our collective memory, on
all that unites the many ethnic groups of Timbuktu.”84
In northern Mali, AQIM applied a classic al-Qaeda strategy to gain control of territory from which
they could operate. AQIM capitalized on the lack of
effective Malian central government presence in the
region, while leveraging the existing conflict between
the Tuareg and the central government to their benefit. External factors, such as the Arab Spring and fall of
Gadaffi’s regime, also worked to AQIM’s advantage,
as it helped drive a new phase of the Tuareg rebellion
and contributed to the conditions that led to the mili30

tary coup. Though the United States and its partners
had created a regional security framework to meet the
threat posed by al-Qaeda, this framework was fragile,
contained many weaknesses, and could not withstand
the set of events that led to AQIM’s control over the
country’s north.
The Tuareg Rebellions.
An ethnic minority, geographically remote from
Mali’s capital, the Tuareg have long felt politically and
economically marginalized. During both the French
colonial period and after Malian independence, the
integration of the highly independent Tuaregs into the
state has been a much contested issue. The Tuaregs
have a long history of conflict with the central government. Historically, these conflicts, which tend to center on the administrative region of Kidal, have been
motivated by politics and economics, not religious
extremism:
The most important single element in recent northern unrest has been political disaffection among one
group of Tuareg inhabiting the region around Kidal,
northeast of Timbuktu. This disaffection is well documented and has had little to do with religion; rather, it
has been a classic case of conflict between nomads and
central authority.85

Tuareg aspirations traditionally focus on independence or autonomy, not the creation of a religious state
or caliphate. As a result, the Tuareg separatist movement, led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), raises a potential challenge
to Mali’s territorial integrity and internal stability.
From the Malian central government perspective, the
Tuareg actions are a rebellion or insurgency.
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The idea of a Tuareg homeland, Azawad, comprised of Tuareg populated areas in northern Mali,
northern Niger, and southern Algeria came into being
in the 1950s. In Mali, Azawad would include the provinces of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu in the north; constituting about half of Mali’s total territory. The French
briefly considered the idea of creating an independent
state for the Tuareg, which met with great resistance
by Mali and other countries with a Tuareg population.
Also at that time, the Tuareg’s identity and loyalty
was primarily focused on their local communities, not
nationalist aspirations.86 Indeed, even today, it is not
clear how much of the Tuareg community supports
an independent state, and political identity remains
highly localized.
The current Tuareg rebellion in Mali, which started
January 17, 2012, is the fourth wave in a long-standing
series of conflicts between some members of the Tuareg population and the Malian government. The first
rebellion occurred in 1963, and involved the Kidal
Tuareg who resented the government’s attempts to
reduce their autonomy.87 The Tuareg attacked government targets in quick raids. Armed with Soviet
weaponry, the Malian army conducted a vigorous
counterinsurgency campaign and easily defeated the
Tuaregs, who were equipped with camels and outdated small arms. The rebellion was crushed by 1964, and
the northern Tuareg areas placed under repressive
military administration. During the conflict, many of
Mali’s Tuaregs fled into neighboring countries. Lieutenant Colonel Kalifa Keita of the Malian Army noted:
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While the government had succeeded in ending the rebellion, its coercive measures alienated many Tuaregs
who had not supported the insurgents. Atrocities and
human rights abuses on both sides contributed to a
climate of fear and distrust in the north. And while
the government subsequently announced a number
of programs to improve local infrastructure and economic opportunity, it lacked the resources to follow
through on most of them. As a result, Tuareg grievances remained largely unaddressed, and a seething
resentment continued in many Tuareg communities
after 1964. Clearly the problem of instability had been
deferred, not resolved.88

The tactics used by the Malian military included
“massacres, poisoning of wells, and destruction of
flocks,” all actions that violate Muslim principles of
warfare. Indeed, the governmental response to the
1963 rebellion still resonates in Tuareg popular culture. In 2012, the Tuareg desert blues band, Tinariwen,
recorded the song, Soixante-Trois (63):
‘63 has gone, but will return.
Those days have left their traces.
They murdered the old folk and a child just born.
They swooped down to the pastures and wiped out
the cattle . . .
‘63 has gone, but will return.89

The Malian counterinsurgency campaign created a long-standing bitterness that would be fueled
by growing perceptions of economic and political
marginalization.
Periods of devastating drought in the Sahel between 1968 and 1974 and again from 1980 to 1985 destroyed much of the region’s livestock. Without these
economic assets, many Tuaregs became refugees in
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neighboring countries or were forced to work as day
laborers in southern Mali to survive. The loss of their
traditional livelihoods deeply undermined the fabric
of Tuareg society and added to social instability.90
In the late-1980s, large numbers of Tuaregs who had
been working in Libya lost their jobs after the collapse
of world oil prices. Gaddafi had courted the Tuareg,
using radio broadcasts to urge them to join his military. When Libya’s attempt to militarily annex Chad
in 1986 failed, many of these Tuaregs, who had served
as front line troops while Libyans were more protected in the rear, returned to Mali.91 These events, in
addition to the long-standing and unresolved grievance from the 1963 rebellion, fueled a second rebellion
in 1990.
The 1990 rebellion was led by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA: Mouvement
Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad), formed by Tuareg
exiles living in Algeria, including Iyad ag Ghali.92 The
1990 rebellion began with a MPLA attack conducted
on a police post by a small group of Tuareg soldiers recently returned from Libyan army camps killing 18.93
The Traoré government, under increasing pressure to
allow more political participation, used the rebellion
as an excuse to cancel multiparty elections. He fueled
tensions between the north and south of the country
by “portraying the Tuareg as ‘white-dominated feudal
society’ that relied on black slavery to preserve their
traditional way of life.”94
An Algerian-brokered peace treaty, signed April
11, 1992, between the Unified Movements and Fronts
of Azawad and the Malian government (really a transitional government following a military coup that
ended Moussa Traoré’s 23-year rule in April 1991)
ended the second rebellion. Known as the Tamanras-

34

set Accord for the city in Algeria where it was signed,
it contained provisions for a cease-fire, subsequent
integration of former combatants into special units of
Malian armed forces, a repatriation program for people displaced by the conflict, and acknowledgement
of the special status of Northern Mali.95 Northern Mali
was to have increased autonomy and greater control
over its own governance.
One of the most significant results of the Tamanrasset Accord was the formation of temporary security forces to garrison the north. These forces contained
a fixed percentage of Malian Army and rebel combatants. The program was both a confidence building measure, as well as an employment generating
mechanism directed at unemployed, armed Tuareg
youths. By early 1998, “some 3000 Tuaregs combatants—probably more than ever were in the field as
rebels at any one time—have been integrated into the
various Malian security forces and civil service.”96
However, from the Tuareg perspective, many of the
main components of the Tamanrasset Accord were
never honored.97 Also, the decision to sign an agreement with the government of Mali was not unanimous
within the MPLA, the agreement encouraged splintering within the group. As a result, though the MPLA
formally disbanded in 1996, other groups, sometimes
including members from the former MPLA, formed,
and resentment continued to simmer.
In May 2006, violence again erupted; this so-called
third rebellion lasted until 2009 and was focused primarily in the Kidal region. The perception of discrimination was again at the core of Tuareg complaints.
A newly formed group, The May 23 Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC, Alliance Democratique du 23
mai pour le Changement) was active in this rebellion.98
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Included in the movement was Ibrahim Ag Bahanga,
a former MPLA member and former rebel who had
been integrated into the Malian armed forces under
the Tamanrasset Accord. The complaints of the soldiers centered on the slow pace of promotion through
the military ranks and the nature of their assignments.
As in previous rebellions, attacks focused on government targets, including the military garrisons at
Kidal and Menaka.99 Algeria again helped to broker
an agreement between the government of Mali led
by President Touré and the Tuareg. The Algiers Accords (July 2006) included greater autonomy for the
Kidal region, economic development measures, and a
larger role for local Tuareg in security forces. Despite
the accord, conflict continued as a new faction of the
ADC emerged led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. The ADC
continued attacks, taking 23 Malian soldiers hostage
in August 2007. These attacks were denounced by
the former leadership of the ADC, including Iyad Ag
Ghali who had since run for office and was integrated
into politics.
The most recent Tuareg rebellion took place in
October 2011. As Gaddafi’s regime crumbled, leaders of the various Tuareg factions met and formed the
MNLA. Its membership drew former soldiers from
Gaddafi’s army, including its leader, Colonel Ag Mohamed Najem, and deserters from the Malian military.100 The October meeting at a desert oasis was an
attempt to ward off the splintering that had long undermined the Tuareg armed movements. An MNLA
statement released at the time declared, “We’ve overcome our differences and will now present common
political demands which reflect the profound aspirations of our population.” Demands included immediate negotiations with the Malian government.101 The
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most recent outbreak of the rebellion in January 2012
followed failed attempts at dialog between the Malian
government and the MNLA.102
On January 17, 2012, MNLA forces attacked and
captured the northern town of Menaka, near the border with Niger. In the weeks that followed, Tuareg
rebels established control over much of northern Mali,
including Gao, which contains the largest military
base in northern Mali and a strategically significant
military base at Tessalit. Shortly after the March 21
coup in which members of the Malian military overthrew the government of President Touré, the MNLA
established control over Timbuktu.103 Outrage by
some members of the Mali military over the government’s failure to properly equip troops to fight the
heavily armed Tuareg force was a factor in the coup
led by Captain Amadou Sanogo.104 The coup members
accused President Touré of “incompetence in the fight
against Islamic terror.”105 The coup, and the subsequent collapse of Mali’s military presence in the north,
benefitted the MNLA and enabled consolidation of
their gains. However, the secular MNLA eventually
found itself pushed aside by AQIM and its affiliate,
Ansar Dine.
The Impact of the Libyan Revolution.
Though many of the underlying causes of Mali’s
complex security challenge have existed for decades,
the overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime and the return of
heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya upset the
precarious balance of power in northern Mali.106 The
wave of change, often referred to as the Arab Spring,
which swept through North Africa also reenergized
the Tuareg’s long-standing quest for greater autono-
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my, or perhaps independence, in a geographic area
that includes much of northern Mali.
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had long employed Tuaregs in his military, utilizing them in conflicts both in Libya and Chad, and further afield in
Afghanistan and Lebanon. In 1980, he declared Libya
the natural homeland of all Tuaregs and offered them
Libyan nationality.107 When Gaddafi lost power in October 2011, an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Malian Tuareg
fighters returned home.108 These fighters were heavily
armed; the looting and sale of weapons from the Libyan government’s arsenal created a sudden influx of
heavy weaponry in the region.109 Of specific concern
were the 20,000 man operated portable air defense
systems (MANPAD) the Libyan government had in
its arsenal prior to the revolution. Of these, 5,000 have
been secured by a multinational team under implementation of a UN disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration program. An unknown number
are thought to have been destroyed during conflict,
but fears remain that some of the weapons have been
transported outside of Libya and may be in the hands
of armed groups.110 The operational condition of these
weapons is not known, as weaponry were often poorly maintained by Gaddafi’s forces, but operational
MANPADs pose a significant threat to aircraft.
The MLNA claimed to have 1,000 well-armed
fighters;111 while government forces, prior to the 2012
coup, were estimated at 7,350.112 The level of military
experience and weaponry possessed by the current
rebels may distinguish it from previous, less wellarmed and organized rebellions. The MNLA leaders,
Ag Mohamed Najem and Bilal Ag Acherif, held the
rank of colonel in Gaddafi’s army. Also, other members obtained significant military experience in earlier
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rebellions and the Libyan civil war.113 Some high ranking officers from the Malian army, such as Lieutenant
Colonel Ag Mbarek Kay and Colonel Ag Bamoussa,
also bring significant experience to the group.114 The
MNLA had assembled an impressive arsenal, accumulated over a number of years of planning and fortified by heavy weaponry brought by fighters returned
from Libya. They also had experience implementing
long-range guerrilla tactics over distances of hundreds
of miles.115
AQIM in North Africa.
There is no doubt that the Tuareg rebellion, coup,
and the end of Gaddafi’s regime created new opportunities for AQIM to expand its influence in the Sahel and West Africa. AQIM traces its roots to Algeria. Formerly known as the Salafist for Preaching and
Combat group (GSPC, Salafist pour la Predication et le
Combat), they are a splinter group from the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA) that fought a civil war against
Algeria’s secular government in the late-1990s. They
aligned themselves with al-Qaeda in the early 2000s,
and changed their name to AQIM in 2006 after their
pledge of loyalty was accepted by the al-Qaeda leadership.116 However, the extent that AQIM is controlled
or influenced by the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not clear.117
Successful Algerian counterterrorism measures
drove AQIM from Algiers and the surrounding area,
pushing them deeper into southern Algeria and
neighboring countries. AQIM’s increasing presence in
the Sahel is marked by a campaign of kidnappings for
ransom and attempted kidnappings, focused on both
tourists as well as UN and U.S. diplomats and aid
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workers, the killing of a number of hostages and an
assassination of a Malian military official.118 Kidnapping for ransom has proven to be very lucrative for
AQIM; between 2006 and 2011, they are believed to
have received an estimated $70 million.119 Their overall strategy, according to Modibo Goita, is to create
sanctuaries in which to operate, as part of the “Afghanization of the entire Sahel region.”120
Common al-Qaeda themes and narratives characterize AQIM’s messaging:
The bulk of AQIM’s messages, the speeches and statements, consist of the broad strands of Salafi-jihadi
rhetoric, with frequent references to fitna (disorder),
jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance), fasad (corruption),
and the importance of fighting for the return of the
proper way of life. Like other countries al-Qaeda has
targeted, AQIM argues that the governments of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia are
composed of unbelievers and need to be replaced by
governments that adhere to a strict interpretation of
Islamic law (Shari’a).121

An additional goal is to rid the region of foreign
influences, namely the United States and France. In
mid-2010, following the death of a French hostage and
AQIM calls for attacks on France, French government
officials rebutted, saying that they were “at war with
al-Qaeda.”122
The extent of the relationship and cooperation between AQIM and various factions of Tuareg rebels is
a matter of debate; it is clear that the security vacuum
benefited them both.
However, the MNLA had been very adamant about
its relationship to AQIM, denying in strong terms
any possible link to al-Qaeda,123    and claimed it would
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stand as a buffer against it.124 Though not ideologically aligned, there are shared interests, and perhaps
a pragmatic alliance, between AQIM and members
of the Tuaregs, including tribal ties and smuggling
of an array of items including cigarettes, migrants,
and weapons.125 Such illegal activities are even more
important today in a region that has seen its primary
form of legitimate economic activity, tourism, disappear amid AQIM violence, raising the prospect that
people may turn to AQIM, or at least tolerate them,
for economic reasons. “Misery has made the Sahel’s
thousands of unemployed an easy target for recruiters
from extremist groups.”126
AQIM has pursued an integration strategy in Mali;
marriage with locals has proven effective in developing strong local ties. For example, Mokthar Belmokhtar, an Algerian AQIM leader, married a Tuareg
woman, the daughter of one of the chiefs of the Arab
Barabicha tribe in northern Mali.127 AQIM has cast itself as an ally and protector of the local community.
Regardless, the marriage of convenience or “joint offensive” that existed between AQIM and the MNLA
in late 2011 and early 2012 seems to have soured in the
aftermath of the coup. Each group had a starkly different—and incompatible—vision for northern Mali.
Salafi Islam was imposed by force, through AQIM
and its allies, Ansar Dine and MUJAO, during the
campaign for control over the northern cities. By June
2012, Islamist forces had seized control of the region’s
three major cities: Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. In Gao,
for example, Ansar Dine imposed dress regulations
on women, including female doctors in the hospital, part of their enforcement of a strict version of Islamic law.128 There appeared to be very close ties between Ansar Dine and AQIM, the AQIM presence in
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areas controlled by Ansar Dine been described as an
everyday reality, and senior AQIM leaders including Belmokhtar, Abou Zeid, and Nabil Abu Alqama
were seen in Timbuktu shortly after the city fell to
Ansar Dine.129
Ansar Dine, also known as “Defenders of the
Faith,” rose out of a splintering inside the Tuareg
nationalist movement. The group was founded in
November 2011 and led by the influential Tuareg nationalist leader, Iyad ag Ghali. Ag Ghali had become
a follower of the fundamentalist Islamist group, Tabligh I Jumaat, and was subsequently sidelined by the
broader nationalist movement.130 Ag Ghali rejected the
MNLA goal of independence, instead stating that the
imposition of sharia, rather than independence should
be the primary goal.131
Though Ansar Dine is estimated to have only 300
followers, its influence on life in areas under its control was great, with reports of:
ordering women to wear veils and respect Islamic
law. They have been going to hairdressers and ripping down photos of unveiled women, shutting down
brothels and prohibiting the sale of alcoholic drinks.132

Despite their differences, Ansar Dine signed an
agreement brokered by Algeria with the MNLA in lateMay 2012 to cooperate and work together to create an
independent Islamic state on the territory they occupy,
stating both sides had made concessions.133 Only a few
days later, the merger was rejected by MNLA over the
issue of Shari’a.134 The MNLA ultimately dropped its
demand for independence and entered into peace negotiations with the Malian government in December
2012. In January 2013, they welcomed the French mili-
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tary intervention in the north, offering support on the
ground, declaring: “We can do the job on the ground.
We’ve got men, arms and, above all, the desire to rid
Azawad of terrorism.”135
AQIM, itself, was not immune to splintering. In
2011, some younger members of AQIM broke off to
form the MUJAO. There may also be an ethnic dimension to the split as MUJOA’s leadership is made up of
black Africans, leading to speculation they resented
domination by AQIM’s Arab leadership. Still others
have suggested the split was a result of suspicions
that AQIM had been infiltrated by Algerian security
services. Sharing the same goals as AQIM, MUJAO
has been very active in kidnapping for ransom.136 In
November 2012, MUJAO claimed to have ousted the
MNLA rebels from Menaka.137
The speed at which Islamist forces were able to
consolidate their hold over the cities in the north and
begin to push into other areas factored into France’s
decision to take action rather than awaiting the arrival
of regional force. In December 2012, the UN authorized deployment of an African-led security force to
Mali, providing a legal international mandate for the
use of force in Mali. The AFISMA was to be composed
of forces, drawn primarily from ECOWAS countries,
with a 1-year mandate.138 However, creation of the
force would take time and their level of capability was
a concern. According to the French foreign minister,
“France had little choice but to intervene urgently or
Islamist forces might have made it to Bamako. . . .”139
On January 11, 2013, French air strikes on Mali
launched Operation SERVAL. France deployed nearly
4,000 troops to Mali, including Special Forces. Working alongside Malian troops, they quickly forced the
Islamists out of the region’s major cities. Troops from
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neighboring Chad also deployed, taking heaving casualties in the fight for Kidal.140 The cost of Operation
SERVAL as of April 16, 2013, had reached €205 million.
The total included €91 million for strategic transport,
€55 million for personnel and €59 million in miscellaneous costs.141 The United States provided logistical,
technical, and intelligence support to Operation SERVAL, including air tankers to refuel French jets and
transport planes.142 Though the Barack Obama administration had initially declared they would not provide any ground troops in support of the French April
2013 operation, they confirmed they had deployed a
small number of troops (approximately 22) in noncombat liaison roles to French and African troops.143
In addition, the United States provided air tanker refuelers and transport planes.144 Deciding intervention
was in its national interests, Canada provided a C-17
aircraft, 25 percent of Operation SERVAL’s strategic
lift, to transport French armored vehicles, trucks,
and troops.145
France began to withdraw its force in April 2013
and plans to have no more than 1,000 troops in the
country by the end of 2013. Their duties are transitioning to the regional African force, AFISMA, which
numbered approximately 6,300 in late April.146 The
size of the force, following the approval of a revised
concept of operations by the African Union’s (AU)
Peace and Security Council, will be 9,620 personnel,
including 171 civilians, 590 police officers, and 8,859
military personnel.147 However, it will take some time
for AFISMA to reach full deployment. Discussions
over the size and status of the force are ongoing. Mali,
with the support of ECOWAS and the African Union,
requested the UN transition the force to a peacekeeping operation when possible. A subsequent report by
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the UN Secretary General ruled out this option, instead proposing either:
. . . beefing-up the current multidimensional presence in Bamako and transforming it into an integrated
political presence with a better resourced AFISMA.
AFISMA would then have “an offensive combat and
stabilisation mandate, focusing on extremist armed
groups,” together with bilateral military efforts. AFISMA would then transition to a UN stabilisation
mission once certain critical benchmarks are met. The
second option advocates for an integrated stabilisation
mission with a military strength of 11,200 under Chapter VII alongside a parallel force to conduct counterterrorism operations beyond the scope of the UN’s
mandate.148

While much of the focus right now is on AFISMA
and stabilization of the northern part of Mali, there is
an urgent need to examine the overall regional security framework and the U.S. role in it. At the time of the
March 2012 coup, the United States had spent nearly a
decade developing a regional security framework. The
coup, and the speed at with AQIM was able to capitalize on it, illustrate the fragility of this framework. Part
III explores the weaknesses of the regional framework
and identifies issues and challenges that will impact
on creating a robust regional security framework.
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PART III: THE SAHEL REGIONAL SECURITY
FRAMEWORK
With the exception of Nigeria, a significant source
of U.S. oil, the United States had little strategic interest in West Africa, and the Sahel in general, before
September 11, 2001 (9/11). The U.S. regional security
framework in the North African Sahel was born out of
post-9/11 concerns that the region could be a possible
haven for members of the transnational al-Qaeda network. Under the Global War on Terror paradigm, Africa, with its poor governance, ethnic conflict, extreme
poverty, and the availability of ungoverned spaces
could become “fertile breeding grounds for transnational Islamist terror.”149
In 2002, the U.S. State Department launched the
Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which later evolved into the
Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
program. In its first year, the Pan Sahel Initiative
spent $6.25 million to conduct training and capacity
building in Niger, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania. These
partner military forces received training from the U.S.
Marines and Army Special Forces and were provided
tactical equipment such as night vision goggles.150
A defining moment that reinforced the need for a
well-planned and coordinated regional effort against
counterterrorism in the Sahel was the response to the
2003 kidnapping of 32 European hostages by AQIM’s
predecessor, the GSPC. The ensuing transnational gun
battle went from Mali to Niger to Chad. The hunt for
the GSPC leader, the Algerian paratrooper Amari Saifi
known as “El Para,” involved troops from Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Chad, with support from the United
States European Command (EUCOM).151
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The creation of the TSCTP in 2005 further expanded the extent of the regional security framework, while
increasing focus on the underlying socioeconomic and
political issues that drive violence and instability. A
collaboration between the U.S. State Department and
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the TSCTP:
supports African states’ efforts to improve border
security and counterterrorism capacity while also facilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic
governance, and improving relations with the US.152

The regional framework was expanded to include
Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal. With
an anticipated budget of $100 million for 2007-13, the
TSCTP is more heavily funded than the PSI, though
the resources pale in comparison with the vastness of
the continent. The TSCTP also reflects a shift, at least
rhetorically, to a more comprehensive or whole-ofgovernment approach toward terrorism that includes
development initiatives. While military operations
were still to be a major focus, emphasis was placed on
increasing collaboration above the tactical level. Other
government agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Department of Treasury were to address underlying issues
ranging from educational opportunities to moneyhandling controls, caused the program to be renamed
the Trans Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative.153
The military training exercise Flintlock launched
the TSCTP in 2005. Flintlock is directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sponsored by AFRICOM and the Joint Special Operations Task Force,
and conducted by the TSCTP and Special Operations
Forces. This multinational exercise regularly draws
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participants from 16 countries, including those from
the Sahel region as well as Canada and European states.
Flintlock 2012, scheduled for February 27-March 18 in
Mali, was to emphasize military support to humanitarian assistance operation. It was cancelled February
10 due to ongoing clashes between government forces
and rebel in the country’s north.154 The smaller annual exercise, Atlas Accord, took place in Mopti, Mali,
from February 7-15, 2012. The exercise focused on enhancing air drop capabilities and drew more than 300
participants from seven countries.155
Organizationally, TSCTP was part of the EUCOM’s
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Trans Sahel (OEFTS). In 2008, the TSCTP was transferred to the newly
established AFRICOM. The creation of AFRICOM in
2007 reflects the U.S. Government’s militarization of
its relationship with African governments in the last
decade. At its establishment, AFRICOM was touted
for its potential capacity building and humanitarian
role in Africa, the White House emphasized its ability
to keep the peace through security cooperation:
Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring
peace and security to the people of Africa and promote
our common goals of development, health, education,
democracy, and economic growth in Africa.156

Despite such statements, which intended to quell
African concern over the growing U.S. military presence on the continent, AFRICOM’s focus has been
overwhelmingly on tactical level counterterrorism
activities:
. . . the Department of Defense’s (DoD) most significant endeavors in Africa have been undertaken in pursuit of narrowly conceived goals related to the Global
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War on Terrorism (GWOT). Operations in North and
East Africa, though couched in a larger framework
of development, long-term counterinsurgency, and a
campaign to win “hearts and minds,” have nonetheless relied on offensive military operations focused on
short-term objectives.157

In short, the U.S. regional security framework for
the Sahel has focused heavily on increasing local militaries capabilities to conduct direct action, not building
long-term community and national level institutional
capacity and resiliency to combat violent extremism
or the development of strong national governance.
Debate continues over the appropriateness of a rather
broad and ambiguous peace and security role for AFRICOM and the portrayal of it mission as “preventative.” Critics note that it is “highly plausible” that AFRICOM will use it full combatant command functions
to respond to threats or crises on the continent, selling
it as a preventative force creates the potential for backlash should that occur.158
Beyond failing to systematically address the drivers of conflict and extremism, some critics argue that
increasing the ability of African partner governments
to suppress terrorism within their own borders may
have had the unintended consequence of increasing
U.S. enemies. Such new counterterrorism capabilities
have been used to repress local Muslim social and political organizations that have no link to al-Qaeda in
an effort to reduce political challenges.159 Counterterrorism capabilities and participation in the U.S.-led
GWOT can be used by those in power to settle longstanding scores against groups or individuals, a potential factor in the recent Mali crisis.
In his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, David Gutelius, a consulting senior
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fellow at Johns Hopkins University, described the
situation in Mali:
From the beginning in 2003, key Tamashek and Arab
populations were largely left out of PSI-sponsored
activities, exacerbating the long-standing ill-will between these groups and the national governments of
Niger and Mali. This fact, combined with the rhetoric
U.S. officials and their local allies used at the time very
quickly brought out older tensions and suspicions,
and linked them to the U.S. military.160

Indeed, the U.S. focus on capacity building to meet
the transnational threat emanating from Mali may
have worsened an internal political situation that ultimately contributed to the overthrow of the civilian
government. A more multifaceted concept of security
threats, to include the role of effective and legitimate
national governance on internal stability, should be
the basis for the future, multidimensional, regional
security framework. Such a framework, however, will
face numerous challenges, many of which cannot be
addressed through the use of military means alone.
Challenges of The Regional Security Framework
in the Sahel.
Differing Priorities among Framework Members.
Differing priorities, and the lack of a common view
of the threat, will continue to challenge the creation of
a robust security framework in the Sahel region and
the partnerships that will sustain it. The United States
has held a far too narrow definition of African security
interests; one that often conflicts directly with the security priorities held by most African states. While the
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threat of transnational violent extremism first drew
the interest of the United States and remains its absolute priority, it is typically not the national priority of
their partner countries. In these countries, the threats
posed by corruption, poor growth, and internal instability, in addition to threats from armed groups,
are, by pragmatism and necessity, often of far greater
concern. In 2002, the AU established the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which established a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s
future. Its action plan established four broad priorities
for Africa:
peace and security, democracy and governance, regional co-operation and integration, and capacity
building. In addition, the framework highlights eight
sectoral priorities, including: agriculture, human development, infrastructure, intra-African trade market
access and the environment.161

This is not to say that the regional framework did
not ever address U.S. priorities, however, the cooperation has been described as ad hoc and inhibited by a
range of regional tensions. For example, in 2010, Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger created the Joint
Military Command in Tamanrasset, Algeria, to operationalize counterterrorism cooperation. Algeria and
Mauritania conducted operations in Mali and Algeria
and even provided Mali with training and equipment
to fight AQIM. However, by January 2012, Algeria
had withdrawn its cooperation in an effort to get Mali
to address the Tuareg issue.162
With the current deployment of AFISMA and
ECOWAS troops into Mali, the regional security
framework has undergone a de facto expansion—and
now includes a far broader range of countries. While
this expanded framework brings benefits, not least of
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which is an African solution to the Mali crisis, it will
increase the challenge of coordination and consensus
building. These countries, too, are constrained by their
national priorities. The Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) is
struggling to recover from a decade-long civil war,
while Guinea’s politics are marked by coups and cancelled elections. Nigeria, which at 1,200 troops is making one of the largest contributions to AFISMA, faces
a growing conflict between the government and the
Islamic militant group, Boko Haram, that will dominate its security concerns.
Two thousand Chadian troops played a significant
role in Operation SERVAL. Long an ally of France,
Chad, at 1,800 troops, is also a major contributor to
AFISMA and will likely expand its role in the region’s
security framework. But Chad faces its own internal
challenges. In May 2013, two senior generals, among
others, were arrested for plotting a coup; though critics contend the government’s actions were to suppress
opponents of President Idriss Deby.163
When the crisis broke, Mauritania reinforced its
border with Mali, helping to contain the situation.
But Mauritania also faces increasing protests by the
Democratic Opposition Coordinating Body, which is
calling for President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and
his government to step down.164
While not an exhaustive list, these are representative of the issues that will compete with the priorities
of a regional security framework.
Lack of Long Term Partnerships.
The lack of long-term alliances with many of the
countries in the region hampered a rapid and robust
U.S. response to regional threats emanating from
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there. Today, it is well understood within the DoD
that “You can’t surge trust. You must build it slowly
and deliberately before a crisis occurs.”165 Any regional framework must rest on the creation of long-term
partnerships, however, both budgetary constraints
and higher priority security issues in other regions
will undermine sustained focus on the Sahel.
Prior to 9/11, U.S. bilateral relations in North Africa focused primarily on Egypt, not the Maghreb, with
a notable exception of Morocco. Much of North Africa
and the Sahel has long been part of a French sphere of
influence on the continent, and the United States has
few deep commercial or economic ties. Similarly, in
West Africa, U.S. relations have focused primarily on
Nigeria, a major source of U.S. oil supplies and Senegal, which participated in Operation DESERT STORM.
When the need arose to address the AQIM threat, the
United States did not have a network of deep partnerships, especially at the military-to-military level, to
draw on in the region; the gaps and seams in this network undermined the overall efficacy of the security
framework.
While the United States has had a long-standing
diplomatic relationship with many countries in the
Sahel zone, the focus was typically on humanitarian
and development aid, not military cooperation. With
the notable exception of Morocco, deep bilateral military-to-military relationships in North Africa and the
Sahel, especially with French speaking countries are
also a post-9/11 phenomenon. The United States and
Algeria, for example, conducted their first formal joint
military dialogue in Washington, DC, in May 2005.
Following 9/11, the George Bush administration
launched a major policy aimed at creating a deeper
network of relations in the region in order to address
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global terrorism. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) focused on democratization, in addition
to economic growth, education, and women’s development. The political overtones of this initiative complicated efforts to build these relationships as regional
governments were resistant to externally imposed political reform. It did not help that the MEPI program
was launched at the same time that the United States
invaded Iraq, an event that was to unleash a “democratic tsunami” in the region. The timing sent a message to the region’s leaders that they could face the
same outcome and increased resistance to externally
imposed political reform.166 Though MEPI’s budget
has increased over time, it was initially poorly resourced, signifying that, despite rhetoric, the region
and its role in GWOT were not a priority. The extent of
the disparity between funds to fight war and money
to prevent potential conflict was noted in a congressional hearing on MEPI by Representative (New York)
Eliot Engel:
I find it ironic, almost surreal, that we are here discussing a program designed to help foster democratization
in the Middle East through an incrementalist program
just as our troops are poised to invade Iraq and bring
democracy there forcefully. We look at the budget.
We have $145 million for the Middle East Peace Initiative, and we have $145 billion for war and rebuilding
in Iraq.167

Indeed, more pressing issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, and later the Horn of Africa, continued to draw
increasingly scarce U.S. financial and diplomatic resources away from potential initiatives in the Sahel.
The long adversarial relationship with Libyan
ruler Muammar Gaddafi excluded it from the U.S.-led
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regional security framework. The antagonism extended for decades, fueled by Gaddafi’s nationalization
of oil companies in 1972, the Gulf of Sidra incident
and Libya’s role in the downing of the airliner PAN
AM 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Though the United
States and Libya began a normalization process prior
to the Libyan revolution in 2011, it was not involved
in formal mechanisms of the U.S. regional security
framework. As a result, the framework had a crucial
and critical gap. Sharing a long border with Algeria,
perhaps the closest U.S. partner in the region today,
and having a long-term relationship with the Tuaregs,
Libya was a major player in the regional security
framework, even if the United States did not wish to
acknowledge it. In addition to his support for the Tuareg and their integration into his military, Gaddafi
also used his oil wealth to pay for essential services
in neighboring countries, giving him considerable influence and reach. Burkina Faso, for example, offered
him exile at the time of the Libyan revolution.
The demise of Gaddafi’s regime, hastened by the
NATO-led Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, was a
catalyst that drove the events leading to the crisis in
northern Mali. While the Libyan revolution may eventually lead to the development of a stable government
with civil society participation, its current instability
in the short term, and the potential for Libya itself to
develop into a safe haven will dramatically impact the
region’s future security framework.
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Competing Interests and Capabilities Among Regional
Partners.
Within the TSCTP regional framework, the differing interests, priorities, and capabilities of the member
states can undermine the effectiveness of the overall
framework. In light of AQIM’s Algerian roots, Mali
views them as an Algerian problem, and has doubts
about Algeria’s level of cooperation. Conversely, Algeria sees Mali as the weak link in the chain, not committed to dealing with AQIM.168 Indeed, the state of relations between Algeria and Mali has been described as
a “rupture of the strategic alliance” during President
Touré’s term. This situation undermined security cooperation to the advantage of both AQIM and Ansar
Dine. To avoid getting drawn into an internal conflict
between the Tuareg and the government, Algeria did
not intervene when the rebels took the strategic border town of Tessalit and did not help Malian forces
hold Kidal, despite the General Staff Joint Operations
Committee (CEMOC) of the region’s countries (Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria) being based in Tamanrasset, southern Algeria.169
At the same time, Algeria has long played a role in
mediating between Mali and the Tuareg, promoting
a political solution. In 2008, they negotiated a shortlived peace deal. Algeria has also played a key role
in the development of regional counterterrorism capability, providing military support to Mali, including
logistics, training, and equipment, especially along
their shared border. Algeria has given Malian soldiers,
both officers and noncommissioned officers, access to
Algerian military schools. In January 2012, Algeria
temporarily froze military support to Mali after Mali
suspended counterterror operations in Gao, Kidal,
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and Timbuktu to focus on addressing the Tuareg rebellion. At the same time, Algeria launched a diplomatic effort to mediate between the MNLA and the
Malian government.170 Algerian diplomats reportedly
tried to pressure the Tuareg into talks. Algeria refused
to treat wounded MNLA fighters, instead insisting on
maintaining its neutral stance in the conflict.171
Distrust, especially over the disputed Western Sahel territory, has long characterized the Algerian-Moroccan relationship. Algeria has accused Morocco of
hosting and supporting the Armed Islamic Group of
Algeria, an accusation Morocco denies.172 Conversely,
some Moroccan officials have accused Algeria of involvement in the 1994 Marrakesh bombing. These tensions led to the closing of their shared border in 1994;
it remains closed.
While Algeria is often concerned that the actions
of its neighbors are counter to Algerian interests and
keeps a wary eye on partnerships such as French-Niger cooperation, it also does not want to be excluded
from regional alliances. Algeria is not part of ECOWAS and is not a participant in AFISMA. However, Algerian permission to overfly its territory was crucial to
the success of Operation SERVAL.173
Memories of the Algerian War of Independence
always overshadow the Algerian-French relationship.
The war, much of which took the form of an urban
guerilla campaign, lasted from 1954 until Algeria’s
independence in 1962. Estimates of Algerian casualties range from 1 to 1.5 million; the French lost over
25,000, with another 65,000 wounded. There is enormous sensitivity inside Algeria to the idea of French
military deployment on their border. In the run up to
Operation SERVAL, Algeria pushed for a political, not
military, solution to the problem of northern Mali.
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Differing Levels of Military Capability among
the Partners.
Among the countries in the regional framework,
Algeria’s military, with a force of 147,000 (127,000 active duty) and a budget exceeding $5 billion a year, is
by far the largest, and likely the most well-trained.174
As Warner notes:
Having fought insurgency and terrorism since the
early 1990s, Algeria’s military was also one of the
strongest, most capable and most battle-hardened in
the region.175

Other regional forces are much smaller in comparison.
Even Chad, which actively participated in Operation
SERVAL and has had a number of notable counterterrorism successes, has a force of only 23,350 and a
budget of $436 million. With a strength of 7,750 troops
(before the coup) and a budget of $174 million, Mali
and Niger (5,300 troops, $53.1 million budget) have
few resources to control their vast territories.176
In a very real sense, Mali’s current crisis is—at least
in part—a result of Algeria’s counterterrorism success,
especially its activities in remote Kabylie Mountains.
There, in the fall of 2012, the local Berbers population
began to turn against AQIM. Frustrated by the impact
of kidnappings on their essential tourist economy,
they began to assist security forces and provide them
with information leading to the capture or killing of
militants. The most significant event was the October
14 killing of Bekkai Boualem, also known as Khaled
El Mig, the head of external relations for AQIM, by
security forces.177 Their success pushed AQIM further
south, into northern Mali.
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Such a “whack-a-mole” approach is also reflected
in the level and type of training provided by the United States to its regional partners, which focused overwhelmingly on tactical level capabilities. There seems
to have been little attention to strategic level considerations and the linkages between the three levels of war.
Operational considerations, such as how residents of
northern Mali, including the Tuareg, would perceive
the U.S. and Malian government counterterrorism cooperation, seem to have been overlooked or ignored.
Though a key element of the military-to-military
engagement was to promote professionalism and deference to civilian authority, the coup in Mali was led
by a U.S. trained officer, Captain Sandogo. This fact,
and the human rights violations by Malian forces,
suggests that more training is needed in this area. According to General Carter F. Ham, former commander
of AFRICOM:
From a purely military standpoint, U.S. forces focused Malian training almost exclusively on tactical
and technical matters such as operating equipment,
improving tactical effectiveness and aerial re-supply
to remote bases. All of which is very, very good, we
didn’t spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on
values, ethics and military ethos.178

In the future, development of the regional security
framework should broaden to include a focus on security sector reform, including strengthening the civilian
institutions that uphold the rule of law, not just security force assistance and tactical level capabilities. Here,
African institutions such as the AU and ECOWAS
may be able to take the lead or provide a substantial
supporting role. The AU developed a common Security Sector Reform framework, and ECOWAS adopted
the Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces and Security
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Services in West Africa. Again, increasing security force
capability without institutional development reform
could worsen the situation in Mali.179
However, ECOWAS’ mandate in Mali, and its
troops’ capabilities, is limited. AFISMA is initially
authorized to operate only for 1 year, until December 2013. Much of that time will be spent organizing and deploying the troops. Critics in the UN and
Europe describe ECOWAS’ initial plan for deployment as confused and inadequate, a factor that led to
France’s action.
The internal chaos in Mali further complicates the
deployment of AFISMA troops. Following the coup,
the Malian military broke up into various factions,
leaving ECOWAS with no single representative to coordinate and define the military mission. The armies
of ECOWAS also have primary expertise in forested
terrain, not the arid terrain of the Sahel.
The Sahel’s Increasing Vulnerability to Humanitarian
Crisis.
During the crisis in northern Mali, Mali and the
surrounding countries faced a severe humanitarian
crisis that was rooted in long-term food insecurity
issues and worsened by increasing flows of refugees
fleeing conflict areas. In April 2012, the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that:
more than 16 million people were facing food security
issues including more than 1 million children under
the age of five who are at risk of severe acute malnutrition, putting them at risk of death from starvation or
disease in the Sahel Region of Western Africa.180
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In Mali, 178,000 children were at risk, 330,000 in Niger,
127,000 in Chad, and 208,000 in Northern Nigeria.181
After the coup and increase in fighting in the north,
few humanitarian organizations were able to remain
in the area and provide services. The United Nations
had no presence during the conflict. The FAO issued a
warning for Mali:
The humanitarian situation, particularly for pastoralists, is a matter of very deep concern as insecurity
worsens in Mali and the food supply is disrupted.
Extreme food insecurity or localized famine situations cannot be excluded if this situation lasts two
or three additional months. (Emphasis in original.) 182

Historically, food insecurity and famine among
the Tuareg is linked to periods of mobilization among
the population for anti-government action. A hunger
crisis and the government’s inability to address it adequately could lead to additional support for the Tuareg rebels and increased calls for independence.183
Fighting in the north also created a refugee crisis.
As of February 2013, there were 260,665 estimated
internal displaced persons in Mali. Of these, 76,500
were located in the north (Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal),
as many others fled south during the conflict.184 Malians, including large numbers of Tuaregs, also fled
to neighboring countries. In June 2013, there were an
estimated 170,000 refugees in Burkina Faso (49,975),
Mauritania (74,108), and Niger (50,000).185 Issues such
as these are, according to General Ham, “patently the
most difficult to address.”
In the aftermath of Operation SERVAL, some refugees and internally displaced persons have begun to
return to their homes, and nongovernmental organizations now have access. However, the impact of the
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conflict will linger, and as of June 2013, northern Mali
remained classified as a food crisis area. It will take
time for trade and market activity to recover. As many
of the most well-off families, who had provided jobs
for other members of society, fled, economic opportunities became scarce.186 Even beyond the current crisis,
Mali faces long-term food security issues that can create dissatisfaction among the population. If the state
cannot meet their needs, others will exploit this gap.
Over the longer term, Mali must also deal with the
effects of climate change.187 The rise of water temperatures in Gulf of Guinea has shifted flow of rain clouds
southwards, causing even greater dryness in the Sahel. Drought has severely impacted cereal production
across the region. In Niger, the cereal harvest was
more than 25 percent smaller in 2011 than in previous
years. Niger faces a shortfall of 500,000 tons of grain,
a situation worse than the previous crises in 2005 and
2010.188 In Mali, grain production has fallen by 41 percent compared to 2011.189 Indeed, the northern Sahel
region has faced three droughts in the last 10 years.
Mali’s average annual rainfall has decreased 30
percent since 1998; droughts are longer and more
common. Desertification, where land is becoming increasingly arid, is also a problem in Mali where the Sahara is moving southward at a rate of 48-km (30 miles)
a year.190 As a result of the Sahara’s southern movement, Mali is experiencing climate zone shift. This
shift will bring additional negative consequences to
Mali. According to 22 global climate models that forecast to 2030, the most negative scenario could mean a
decrease in rainfall by 10 percent and an increase in
average temperatures by 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit. This
scenario would result in a $300 million agricultural
loss for Mali; even under the most optimistic climate
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models, annuals losses of $120 million are forecast.191
This anticipated climate change will put even greater
strains on the population and society in northern Mali,
and increase the potential for instability that can be
exploited by criminals and militants.
Internal Stability in Mali.
Finally, Mali’s own internal political and security
issues prevented it from becoming a reliable partner
in any regional security framework, at least until the
current interim government was replaced with a permanent one. Any new government in Mali may face
a potential protracted conflict with AQIM and associated groups. Though French and African forces were
able to quickly clear the cities, many of the militants
melted away in to the desert and highlands, and likely
across borders, where they may regroup and plan
new attacks.
In a foreboding sign that liberated Mali might descend into insurgency, in February 2013, MUJAO militants used canoes to cross the Niger river and infiltrate
Gao, launching three separate attacks on Malian and
French troops. Two of the attacks were suicide bombings. No French or Malian soldiers were killed, though
one Malian soldier was wounded.192 A few months
later in May 2013, two Malian soldiers were killed by
a suicide bomber in Gao.193
Also recovered in northern Mali was a copy of
an AQAP-authored document containing 22 ways to
avoid drone detection/attacks. Options range from
the low tech, such as the use of reflective pieces of
glass on roof of car or building or hiding under trees
trees, to high tech, including the use of Russian-made
sky grabber device to infiltrate the drone’s waves and
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the frequencies. The device is available in the market
for $2,595.194 Though it is unclear how successful such
tactics are against drones’ electronic countermeasures,
the document illustrates information sharing across
the al-Qaeda network and the potential for low technology approaches to facilitate sustainment of longterm conflict in the region. To build security in the
north long-term security sector reform and political
legitimacy are essential.
The institution of a new government recognized
as legitimate by the country as a whole is an absolute
requirement for Mali to be able to address the security
situation in the north. It is not clear if that will happen.
In December 2012, prime minister Cheick Modibo
Derra and his cabinet resigned abruptly, following his
arrest by a soldier. The country’s military leadership
accused him of playing a personal agenda.195
Presidential elections, originally scheduled for
April 2013, took place in July and August 2013. Despite
the challenges posed by geography, severe weather,
and security issues, the electoral process was largely
considered to be credible. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita,
often referred to as IBK, won the presidency in a second round of voting. He and his opponent, Soumaila
Cissé, received the most votes of the 27 candidates
that stood in the first round of voting. Keita served as
Mali’s prime minister from 1994 to 2000. The successful election will allow Mali to access $4 billion in aid
from international donors that was suspended following the coup.196
A new government will have to be constructed
against a backdrop of growing ethnic tensions unleashed during the conflict in the north. During the
conflict, Malians of Arab or Tuareg descent were looted or harassed, targeted on the basis of their physi-
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cal appearance. Malian soldiers have been accused of
such targeting and committing atrocities against those
from the north. According to one report, “People with
fair skin (notably Tuaregs and Arabs) no longer use
buses to travel between the north and the south.”197
Long simmering tensions have now erupted and will
need to be addressed if there is to be stability in the
long term.
President Keita has stated that a lasting peace
deal—a real peace with the Tuareg—is his first priority. According to a ceasefire that allowed voting to take
place in northern Mali, Keita’s government must open
talks with the Tuaregs within 60 days. Any chance for
long-term stability of Mali rests on the successful conclusion of an agreement and its implementation.198
CONCLUSION
While there is no doubt that the presence of AQIM
in northern Mali is a counterterrorism problem for the
United States, the solutions to the crisis in Mali are
as much political and economic, if not more so, than
military. Long-term stability and resiliency against
militant Islamic extremism depends on an approach in
which the indirect lines of operation, such as economic development, strengthening of political institutions,
and the amelioration of the effects of climate change,
work alongside the careful application of direct action
against the threat of violent extremism.
This will be impossible to achieve without the full
support of the new Malian government. The position
the government adopts toward the Tuareg movements, both nationalist and religious, will determine
the likelihood of bringing long-term stability to Mali.
Should the government decide that it will not nego-
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tiate with Ansar Dine, this will severely complicate
efforts to normalize the north and will allow for the
continuation of grievances than can again be exploited
by AQIM. Similarly, in their joint support for Operation SERVAL, the secular, nationalist Tuaregs and the
Malian government found themselves on the same
side of an issue. Though unplanned, this alignment
offers the opportunity for renewed negotiation on the
status of the Tuareg and the conditions in the north of
the country.
U.S. policymakers should adopt a more multidimensional view of security in Mali, and indeed, Africa
overall. While countering violent extremists must remain a priority, increased emphasis should be focused
on the issues that create the safe havens in which they
hide. Physical security, often secured through military and law enforcement efforts, is a prerequisite for
the development of institutions of good governance.
Without such institutions physical security is fleeting
and needs constant intervention when a crisis erupts.
Building stability in Mali will require a long-term,
focused commitment of money and diplomatic effort.
Such costs are difficult to justify, especially at a time
when the United States and its European allies face
enormous economic challenges. However, the investment in social, political, and economic development
to address the underlying or “upstream” factors that
lead to instability may be a far less expensive option
than paying for military intervention when a crisis
erupts. In the 5 years before the coup, the United States
provided about $400 million in civilian assistance programs to Mali. The first 6 months of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya, however, cost the United
States $1 billion.199 While military assistance was not
responsible for the crisis in Mali, the balance between
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military and civilian forms of assistance in creating
overall security should be given serious consideration. Long-term persistent partnerships with key
partner nations must integrate any counterterrorism
campaign into a multidimensional approach to security that seeks to address diverse types of threats and
potential threats.
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